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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In a companion case decided today, we relate the salient 
facts surrounding the disastrous confrontation between the 
City of Philadelphia police and the members of MOVE. See 
In re City of Phila. Litig., ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir. 1998). 
Although dozens of claims emerged from the ashes and 
rubble of 6221 Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia, the 
present appeal brings before us only the judgment entered 
against Ms. Ramona Africa and in favor of defendants 
William Richmond, the former City of Philadelphia Fire 
Commissioner, and Gregore Sambor, the former City of 
Police Commissioner, on Ms. Africa's state law battery 
claim. 
 
The issue we are called upon to decide in this appeal is 
whether Ms. Africa has properly raised and preserved any 
right she may have had to a jury trial on the issue of willful 
misconduct in relation to her battery claim against 
Richmond and Sambor. In addition, we must determine 
whether the district court erred in determining that Ms. 
Africa failed to show willful misconduct by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Because we conclude that Ms. Africa has 
failed to properly raise and preserve any right to a jury trial 
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that she may have had on the willful misconduct issue and 
because we find that the district court did not err in ruling 
on willful misconduct, we will affirm the judgment entered 
in favor of Richmond and Sambor. 
 
I. 
 
We begin our review with an abbreviated recitation of the 
procedural history relevant to this appeal. On October 6, 
1993, the magistrate judge assigned to this case 
recommended granting summary judgment to all individual 
defendants on the state law claims except Richmond and 
Sambor because each was immune from common law tort 
liability. In re City of Phila. Litig., 849 F. Supp. 331, 364 
(E.D. Pa. 1994). He recommended denying summary 
judgment as to Richmond and Sambor because there was 
evidence that their decision not to extinguish the fire on the 
roof of the MOVE compound constituted "willful 
misconduct," conduct that would preclude them from 
obtaining official immunity from the state law claims under 
Pennsylvania law. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8550 (West 
1982). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
recommendation with respect to Richmond and Sambor 
and denied them summary judgment on the state law 
claims. 
 
After various appeals, remands, and pre-trial decisions, 
Richmond and Sambor filed motions requesting that the 
district court reconsider its summary judgment order 
denying them judgment as a matter of law based on official 
immunity. The district court denied these motions in a 
bench opinion delivered on January 18, 1996. See In re 
City of Phila. Litig., 938 F. Supp. 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The 
court found that there was evidence suggesting that 
Richmond and/or Sambor deliberately disregarded an order 
from General Brooks to put out the fire. Such obvious 
insubordinate conduct, according to the district court, 
could establish willful misconduct -- intentional conduct 
known to be wrong -- because a reasonable factfinder 
could infer from the decision to flout a direct order that 
they knew their conduct was "an excessive response to the 
law enforcement requirements" yet intentionally proceeded 
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with that course of conduct despite this knowledge. Id. at 
1276-77. 
 
In denying Richmond and Sambor's motions for 
reconsideration, the district court also determined that, 
under Pennsylvania law, the issue of willful misconduct 
must be decided by the court rather than by a jury. Id. at 
1270, 1277-78. The court concluded that the reference to a 
judicial determination of willful misconduct in 
Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 
(PSTCA) mandates that the court decide the issue. Id.; see 
also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8550 (West 1982). 
 
A flurry of motions for reconsideration and motions in 
limine followed the court's decision denying reconsideration 
of its summary judgment determination. None of the initial 
motions for reconsideration, however, questioned the 
court's determination that the issue of willful misconduct 
was to be determined by the court.1 In a motion in limine 
filed on March 19, 1996, Sambor first took issue with the 
court's decision that it would determine the issue of willful 
misconduct. Sambor argued that, under Pennsylvania law, 
the issue of willful misconduct should be decided by a jury. 
In response to this motion in limine, Ms. Africa advocated 
that the court deny Sambor's request for a jury 
determination on willful misconduct. In a pretrial 
conference on March 26, 1996, the court again made clear 
that, based upon its interpretation of the PSTCA, the court 
was required to determine the issue of willful misconduct. 
Ms. Africa made no objection to the court's determination 
at that time. 
 
At a pretrial hearing on March 27, 1996, Sambor 
submitted a letter memorandum to the court taking issue 
with the timing of a bench determination on willful 
misconduct and arguing that any bench determination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Sambor filed a motion for reconsideration on January 22, 1996 which 
made no reference to the court's determination that it would decide the 
issue of willful misconduct. Likewise, Ms. Africa's response to the 
defendants' motions filed on January 25, 1996 took no exception to this 
ruling. The parties did not include Richmond's January 23, 1996 motion 
for reconsideration in their appendices in this appeal; Ms. Africa has not 
contended, however, that Richmond's motion raised this issue. 
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must be made after the jury had considered the merits of 
the state law claims. The court accepted Sambor's 
submission and requested that the other parties submit 
their views on this issue. Richmond subsequentlyfiled a 
memorandum reiterating Sambor's position. Ms. Africa 
responded on April 11, 1996 in a "Response to Defendant's 
Motions . . . and Motion for Reconsideration of the January 
18, 1996 Bench Ruling," raising several points relating to 
the burden of proof on willful misconduct. In one sentence, 
in the conclusion of her response, Ms. Africa requested that 
the issue of willful misconduct, if raised, be submitted to 
the jury. Ms. Africa cited no authority for this request. In a 
supplemental submission filed on April 15, 1996, Ms. Africa 
made no specific demand that the willful misconduct issue 
be determined by a jury. 
 
At a pretrial conference on April 18, 1996, the court 
outlined the procedure it intended to follow with respect to 
the battery claim. The court explained that the jury would 
first decide the substantive state law claims. If the jury 
found against Richmond and/or Sambor, the court would 
then decide the issue of willful misconduct, conforming its 
findings, if necessary, to the jury's findings. No objections 
were made to this procedure at that time. 
 
On June 24, 1996, the jury returned a verdict against 
Richmond and Sambor on the battery claim, thus 
necessitating a ruling on official immunity. In an opinion 
and order dated August 27, 1996, the district court held 
that because plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of 
establishing willful misconduct, Richmond and Sambor 
were entitled to official immunity on the battery claim. In re 
City of Phila. Litig., 938 F. Supp. 1278, 1290-93 (E.D. Pa. 
1996). The court held that the claims against Richmond 
failed because the trial testimony dispelled any possibility 
that Richmond willfully disregarded Brooks' order.2 Id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The question of whether Richmond had received Brooks' order and 
subsequently disregarded it was disputed at the summary judgment 
stage due to Sambor's testimony before the MOVE Commission that 
Richmond was present when Brooks ordered Sambor to put out the fire. 
Sambor recanted this testimony at trial, acknowledging that his 
testimony before the MOVE Commission was erroneous. Richmond's 
testimony that he instructed his firefighters to extinguish the fire as 
soon as he received orders to do so was therefore undisputed at trial. 
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1290. As to Sambor, the district court weighed the evidence 
and concluded that plaintiffs did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Sambor committed 
willful misconduct. The district court specifically credited 
Sambor's testimony that he and Richmond agreed to let the 
fire neutralize the bunker before receiving any order from 
Brooks to extinguish the fire. Id. at 1292-93. The district 
court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Richmond 
and Sambor on the battery claim on August 28, 1996. Ms. 
Africa timely filed this appeal from that final judgment. 
 
Ms. Africa asserts that the district court erred in failing 
to submit the issue of willful misconduct to a jury. In 
addition, she challenges the district court's legal and 
factual determinations in relation to its ruling on willful 
misconduct. Because we find that Ms. Africa failed to 
properly raise and preserve any right she may have had to 
a jury trial on the issue of willful misconduct and that the 
district court's legal and factual determinations on willful 
misconduct were not erroneous, we will affirm the district 
court's judgment in favor of Richmond and Sambor. 
 
II. 
 
The right to a jury trial in federal court, regardless of 
whether the claim arises under state law, presents a 
question of federal law. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 
(1963) (per curiam); Cooper Labs., Inc. v. International 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Although the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the 
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, like 
all constitutional rights it can be waived by the parties. 
United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621 (1951). Unlike 
other constitutional rights, however, an intentional 
relinquishment of the right is not required for waiver; the 
right to a jury trial can be waived by inaction or 
acquiescence. See, e.g., Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 
1049 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that jury trial right was waived 
by acquiescence); see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, S 2321 (2d ed. 
1995) (noting that the intentional relinquishment standard 
is inapplicable to waiver of the right to a trial by jury). 
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A. 
 
Because the right to a jury trial in federal court is a 
question of federal law, our starting point is with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 38, in order to 
preserve the right to trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment or by statute, a party must serve a 
demand for a jury trial upon the other parties no later than 
ten days after the last pleading directed to the issue to by 
tried by the jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. If the party does not 
specify which issues are to be tried by a jury, the party will 
be deemed to have demanded trial by jury on all issues. Id. 
Once a demand for a jury trial properly has been made, all 
issues will be tried to a jury unless the parties consent to 
a non-jury trial or the court finds that a right to a jury trial 
on some or all of the issues does not exist under the 
Constitution or statutes of the United States. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 39(a). 
 
It is undisputed that Ms. Africa included a general 
demand for a jury trial in her initial complaint in 
compliance with Rule 38. Ms. Africa contends that she 
therefore preserved her right to have the issue of willful 
misconduct determined by a jury simply because she never 
consented, by oral or written stipulation as provided in 
Rule 39(a), to a non-jury trial. We disagree. 
 
Our sister courts of appeals have taken a broad approach 
to interpreting Rule 39(a) and accordingly have held that a 
party may waive his right to a jury trial under Rule 39(a) 
not only by stipulation, but also by failing to object to a 
court order. See e.g., Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal 
Court, 863 F.2d 461, 464-65 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that 
courts have interpreted Rule 39(a) broadly and holding that 
plaintiff waived right to a jury trial by failing to object to 
court order setting case for bench trial). In fact, our sister 
court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit has specifically 
declined to read Rule 39(a) in the formalistic fashion 
advocated by Ms. Africa. See White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 
699, 701 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, in Cooper v. Loper, 923 
F.2d 1045, 1049 (3d Cir. 1991), we joined the majority of 
our sister courts in advocating waiver by acquiescence by 
adopting the well established rule that a party's 
participation in a bench trial without objection waives any 
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Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial that the party may 
have had. See also Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 
366, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1998) (reaffirming our adoption of the 
Cooper rule). 
 
Two considerable policy considerations counsel in favor 
of adopting the rule that parties may waive their Seventh 
Amendment rights by acquiescing in a judicial 
determination that an issue will be tried by the court. The 
first is the well established principle that it is inappropriate 
for an appellate court to consider a contention raised on 
appeal that was not initially presented to the district court. 
See Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 772 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 99-100 
(3d Cir. 1990). The second is the valid concern that a party 
should not be permitted to silently acquiesce in a trial 
court's plan to try an issue non-jury by failing to make a 
timely objection and later demand a new trial only after it 
has lost on the merits. See Cooper, 923 F.2d at 1049; see 
also United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. New 
Jersey Zinc Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(refusing to condone practice of awaiting court's decision on 
the merits before raising jury trial issue). Promotion of such 
tactics would not only lead to an unnecessary squandering 
of judicial resources but would also reduce a trial court's 
bench proceeding to a meaningless exercise in futility. See 
Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(discussing policy considerations). 
 
In keeping with these policy considerations which have 
traditionally informed our Seventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, we hold today that where a party has made 
a general demand for a jury trial and the court 
subsequently determines that a certain issue will be 
determined non-jury, it is incumbent upon that party to 
timely lodge a specific objection in order to preserve any 
Seventh Amendment jury trial right he may have with 
respect to that issue. This rule is consistent with our 
general policy against ruling on an issue first raised on 
appeal that the district court never had the opportunity to 
consider. In addition, it preserves the integrity of the 
judicial process by ensuring that judicial determinations 
are given full effect and prevents the tremendous waste of 
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precious judicial resources that otherwise would result from 
duplicitous litigation. 
 
B. 
 
Accordingly, once the district court determined that the 
issue of willful misconduct would be determined without a 
jury, it was incumbent upon Ms. Africa to timely lodge a 
specific objection to that determination in order to preserve 
her right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. We 
find that Ms. Africa failed to set forth a sufficiently timely 
and specific objection to preserve any jury trial rights that 
she may have had. 
 
At oral argument before us, Ms. Africa was unable to 
point to any specific objection stating that her right to a 
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment would be abridged 
if the court were to determine the issue of willful 
misconduct. Our independent review of the record has also 
failed to locate such an objection. The absence of a specific 
objection on this point leads us to conclude that Ms. Africa 
has waived any right she may have had to a jury trial on 
the issue of willful misconduct. 
 
Ms. Africa, however, contends that her one sentence 
request in the conclusion of her response of April 11, 1996 
was sufficiently timely and definite to preserve her right to 
a jury trial. We disagree. By the time Ms. Africa submitted 
her response, the debate as to whether the court would 
determine willful misconduct was over. 
 
The court had first announced its determination that it 
would resolve the willful misconduct issue on January 18, 
1996. None of the initial pleadings relating to 
reconsideration of this determination, including Ms. Africa's 
January 25, 1996 response to the defendants' motions for 
reconsideration, objected to the court's decision that it, 
rather than the jury, would determine willful misconduct. 
In addition, when Sambor first objected to a judicial 
determination of the issue in his March 19, 1996 motion in 
limine, Ms. Africa responded by taking the position that the 
issue had been conclusively determined and that Sambor's 
motion in limine should therefore be denied. Finally, when 
the court reiterated its position that it would determine the 
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issue at the March 27, 1996 pretrial hearing, Ms. Africa 
made no objection. The court therefore had every reason to 
believe that, by March 27, 1996, Ms. Africa had waived any 
right she may have had to a jury trial on willful 
misconduct. 
 
Furthermore, Ms. Africa's April 11, 1996 response was 
submitted in answer to the court's request that the parties 
give their views on the proper sequence in trying the state 
law claims. At that juncture, neither the court nor the 
parties were focusing on the issue of whether willful 
misconduct should be tried to a jury. The district court 
should not be expected to view a passing reference in the 
conclusion of this response as a valid demand under the 
Seventh Amendment absent a clear and substantiated 
argument relating to the grounds for such a demand. 
 
In short, Ms. Africa's one sentence demand in a pleading 
unrelated to her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
made almost four months after the court's initial 
determination on the issue was too little too late. Her 
request was not sufficiently specific to alert the court that 
she was exercising any rights she may have had under the 
Seventh Amendment to demand a jury trial on willful 
misconduct. In addition, her request was untimely. 
Accordingly, we find that Ms. Africa failed to adequately 
raise and preserve any right she may have had to a jury 
trial on willful misconduct. 
 
III. 
 
Ms. Africa also contends that the district court's decision 
on willful misconduct is fraught with legal error because 
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard and 
failed to correctly weigh the evidence presented. Neither 
contention has merit. The district court correctly 
interpreted Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 
1994) as requiring a subjective standard of willfulness that 
calls for a showing of an intention to do what is known to 
be wrong. See Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1998). In 
addition, the district court did not err in applying this 
standard and in weighing the conflicting evidence to 
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determine that Ms. Africa had failed to show willful 
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re 
City of Phila. Litig., 938 F. Supp at 1290-93. Specifically, 
after independently reviewing the trial testimony, we 
conclude that the district court's findings that Richmond 
never learned of Brooks' order to put the fire out, that 
Sambor directed Richmond to put out the fire as soon as he 
received the order from Brooks, and that neither Richmond 
nor Sambor engaged in willful misconduct in disregarding 
Brooks' order or in allowing the fire to burn, are not clearly 
erroneous. While Ms. Africa contends that the district court 
did not consider certain evidence relating to the decision to 
initially allow the fire to burn, she has failed to point us to 
any evidence that would compel a finding that either 
Richmond or Sambor engaged in conduct they knew to be 
wrong. Accordingly, because we do not find any legal error, 
we must affirm the district court's judgment on Ms. Africa's 
battery claim. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we find that Ms. Africa waived any right she may 
have had to a jury trial on the issue of willful misconduct 
by failing to timely and specifically object to the district 
court's January 18, 1996 decision that it would determine 
the issue. In addition, we do not find any legal error with 
the district court's judgment in favor of Richmond and 
Sambor on Ms. Africa's battery claim. Accordingly, we must 
affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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